Despite mounting evidence that Daylight Saving Time (DST) fails in its primary goal of saving energy, some form of DST is still practiced by over 1.5 billion people in over 60 countries. I demonstrate that DST imposes high social costs on Americans, specically, an increase in fatal automobile crashes. DST alters fatal crash risk in two ways: disrupting sleep schedules and reallocating ambient light from the morning to the evening. First, I take advantage of the discrete nature of the transitions between Standard Time and DST to measure the impact of DST on fatal crashes in a regression discontinuity design. Then, to measure the duration of the eect, I exploit variation in the coverage of DST created primarily by a 2007 policy change, in a day-of-year xed eects model. Both models reveal a short-run increase in fatal crashes following the spring transition and no aggregate impact in the fall. Employing three tests, I decompose the aggregate eect into ambient light and sleep mechanisms. I nd that shifting ambient light reallocates fatalities within a day, while sleep deprivation caused by the spring transition increases risk. The increased risk persists for the rst six days of DST, causing a total of 302 deaths at a social cost of $2.75 billion over the 10-year sample period, underscoring the huge costs of even minor disruptions to sleep schedules. JEL Codes: R41,
Introduction
Daylight Saving Time (DST) in the US was originally implemented as a wartime measure to save energy and was extended as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
However, recent research demonstrates that DST does not save energy and could possibly increase energy use (Kellogg and Wol, 2008; Kotchen and Grant, 2011) . Despite mounting evidence that DST fails in its primary goal, some form of Daylight Saving Time is still practiced by over 1.5 billion people globally. In this paper I demonstrate that DST imposes high social costs on Americans, specically, an increase in fatal automobile crashes. Employing three tests to dierentiate between an ambient light or sleep mechanism, I show that this result is most likely due to sleep deprivation caused by the spring transition and the result implies additional costs of DST in terms of lost productivity nationwide.
The procedure for DST is well characterized by the phrase spring-forward, fall-back.
Each year on the spring transition date, clocks are moved forward by one hour, from 2 a.m. to 3 a.m. The process is then reversed for the fall transition with clocks falling back from 2 a.m. to 1 a.m. This alters the relationship between clock time and solar time by an hour, eectively moving sunlight from the morning to the evening (see Figure   1 ). The procedure was rst suggested by George Vernon Hudson, an entomologist who wanted more light in the evenings to pursue his passion of collecting insects (Hudson, 1895) . While the policy was rst used during World Wars I and II, it has since become a peacetime measure. In all instances, the rationale has been that aligning sunlight more closely with wakeful hours would save energy used for lighting.
1 However, as Hudson's personal motivation for the policy suggests, DST has many impacts on practicing populations.
This paper focuses on a major side-eect of DST, its impact on fatal vehicle crashes.
DST alters the risk of a fatal crash in two ways: disrupting sleep schedules and reallocating ambient light from the morning to the evening. With an average of over 39,000
annual fatalities, motor vehicle crashes are the number one cause of accidental death in the US (CDC, 2005 (CDC, -2010 ). Given the large base level of fatalities, even a small change in fatal crash risk is a potentially large killer. I identify the impact of DST on fatal crashes by taking advantage of (i) detailed records of every fatal crash occurring in the United 1 DST is often mistakenly believed to be an agricultural policy. In reality, farmers are generally against the practice of DST because it requires them to work for an extra hour in the morning, partially in darkness, to coordinate with the timing of markets (Prerau, 2005) .
States from 2002-2011; (ii) and nd no impact of these dates when not associated with a policy change. I then examine the relative contribution of each DST mechanism.
Daylight Saving Time impacts practicing populations through two central channels.
First, it creates a short-term disruption in sleeping patterns following the spring transition. Harrison (2013) surveys the sleep literature and nds that increased sleep fragmentation and sleep latency caused by the 23-hour spring transition date present a cumulative eect of sleep loss, at least across the following week. Second, DST alters the relationship between clock time and solar time by an hour, creating darker mornings and lighter evenings than would be observed under Standard Time (see Figure 1) . 3 Even this one hour shift in light can have major consequences; Doleac and Sanders (2013) nd that increased ambient light in evenings reduces crime while Wol and Makino (2013) suggest that it increases time devoted to exercise.
To parse out these mechanisms and determine what portion of the increase in fatal crashes is due to sleep loss versus reallocating light, I run three primary tests. These tests exploit dierential timing in when each mechanism is active, both within and across days. First, I isolate the light mechanism by examining only the fall transition. Then, I look at the dierence between aggregate estimates in the fall (only the light mechanism) and spring (light and sleep mechanism) to determine the net impact of the 2 Barnes and Wagner (2009) nd that Americans sleep 40 minutes less on the night of the spring transition, but experience no signicant change in sleep quantity on the fall transition.
3 Since fatal crashes are more prevalent in the evening ( Figure A1 ), it is possible that transferring light from a lower risk morning period to a higher risk evening period could lead to a net reduction in fatal crashes.
4 Americans do not sleep a signicant amount more on the fall transition date despite receiving an extra hour in the middle of the night (Barnes and Wagner, 2009). sleep mechanism. Second, I isolate the sleep mechanism in the spring by examining a subsample of hours furthest from sunrise and sunset. These hours are least impacted by the light mechanism and a drowsy driver is presumably more at risk throughout the entire day, even in hours of full light or full darkness. Third, I compare the sleep impacted days of DST (up to the rst two weeks) to the remainder of DST with common support.
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All three tests suggest that the sleep deprivation is driving the increase in fatal crashes.
My preferred specication reveals a 6.3% increase in fatal crashes, persisting for six days following the spring transition. Over the 10-year sample period, this suggests the spring transition is responsible for a total of 302 deaths at a social cost of $1.2 to $3 billion, underscoring the huge costs of even minor disruptions to sleep schedules given the current sleep-deprived culture in the US. 6 , 7 The total costs of DST due to sleep deprivation could be orders of magnitude larger when worker productivity is considered (Wagner et al., 2012; Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi, 2000) .
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This nding is timely, given the recent empirical research suggesting that DST does not reduce energy demand. Kellogg and Wol (2008) use a natural experiment in Australia where DST was extended in some states to accommodate the Sydney Olympics.
They nd that while DST reduces energy demand in the evening, it increases demand in the morning with no signicant net eect. Kotchen and Grant (2011) For a failed energy policy to be justied from a welfare standpoint, the social benets must outweigh the social costs. In this paper, I nd a signicant mortality cost that must be weighed against any perceived benets of DST.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief background of DST in the US. Section 3 details the mechanisms through which DST inuences crash risk, including reviewing existing evidence of the impact of DST on vehicle crashes. Section 4 introduces the data, highlighting the visual discontinuity in raw 5 Common support refers to dates that are DST in some years and Standard Time in others.
6 Social cost is based on Kniesner et al. (2012) value of a statistical life range of $4 to $10 million. 8 There has been surprisingly little empirical research on the eects of sleep on worker productivity.
Although fatal crashes are an extreme measure of productivity, driving is a behavior engaged in by over 90% of American workers (Winston, 2013) 
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In the next section, I discuss the primary mechanisms through which DST could inuence fatal crash risk and how I disentangle the relative contributions of each.
Mechanisms
There are two mechanisms through which Daylight Saving Time could impact fatal crash risk. First, there is sleep loss associated with the spring transition when one hour in the middle of the night is skipped. Since sleep is a key factor in alertness and control (Smith, McEvoy, and Gevins, 2002) , this sleep deprivation likely reduces driving safety.
In a study of 400 U.S. Army soldiers, Legree et al. (2003) (Fridstrom et al., 1995; Sullivan and Flannagan, 2002) , and this reallocation of light within a day creates riskier morning driving conditions and less risky evening driving conditions during DST. 11 I next discuss each mechanism individually, outlining its likely eect on fatal crashes and reviewing existing evidence of its impact through DST.
Sleep Mechanism
The spring transition into DST is facilitated by clocks jumping forward from 2 a.m.
to 3 a.m. on the transition date. This creates a 23-hour transition day, rather than the standard 24-hour days people are accustomed to. While this missing hour could be cut from work or leisure time, Barnes and Wagner (2009) Depending on the individual, this transition could impact sleep patterns for anywhere from two days to two weeks (Valdez et al., 1997) with an average of about one week (Harrison, 2013) .
In the fall, the opposite scenario occurs with a 25-hour transition day. However, in this case, Americans use very little of the extra hour for sleep, sleeping a statistically insignicant extra 12 minutes (Barnes and Wagner, 2009 ). This creates variation in treatment status for the sleep mechanism. The spring transition is treated (sleep loss), while the fall transition is untreated (insignicant change to sleep quantity).
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Previous research on the sleep impact of DST on vehicle crashes has been mixed. Coren (1996) and Varughese and Allen (2001) nd an increase in crashes on the Monday following the spring transition into DST, while Sood and Ghosh (2007) and Lahti et al. (2010) suggest no eect. By focusing on one day, these tests can lack power and often cannot rule out a wide range impacts. In contrast to these studies, I gain statistical power by testing for a longer term sleep impact consistent with recent literature on sleep disruptions.
Additionally, these previous studies use data centered in 1992, 1985, 1987 and 1994 respectively. Average sleep quantity has been on the decline in the US, a phenomenon also seen in the lower tail of the distribution. According to the National Sleep Foun-11 When switching out of DST in the fall, the mornings become less risky and evenings more risky than under DST.
12 Sexton and Beatty (2014) 
Light Mechanism
Despite strong evidence suggesting the importance of ambient light in fatal crash risk, the implication for net crashes due to Daylight Saving Time remains unclear. DST does not alter the amount of light in a day, it simply reallocates it between the morning and the evening. Since fatal crashes are more prevalent in the evening ( Figure A1 ), it is possible that transferring light from a lower risk morning period to a higher risk evening period could lead to a net reduction in fatal crashes.
Previous studies by Ferguson et al. (1995) and Broughton, Hazelton, and Stone (1999) examine the light mechanism by estimating the impact of ambient light on fatal crash risk directly, and then simulating the impact of imposing DST light levels on the rest of the year. Both studies suggest a reduction in fatal crashes through this mechanism. 14 Since the initial Sunday of DST is 23 hours long, whereas other days are 24
hours long, I adjust the crash count by counting the 3-4 a.m. hour twice, using it as a proxy for the missing 2-3 a.m. hour. For the 25-hour fall transition date, I divide the fatalities occurring from 2-3 a.m. by two, because this hour occurred twice.
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My dependent variable in all specications is the natural log of the number of fatal crashes occurring on a given day at the national level. I aggregate to the national level due to the relative rarity of fatal crashes. There are roughly 100 fatal crashes per day across the entire US and the mode for daily crashes at the state level is zero.
Aggregating allows me to gain statistical power and smooths out potential confounders such as weather which could drive results in some states or even regions, but likely not the entire US. 
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This provides suggestive evidence that the spring transition is associated with a short term increase in fatal crashes. My initial estimation strategy (RD) formally tests for this discontinuity.
If complete data were available for less severe crashes, it could be analyzed in the same identication framework I propose. However, many states do not maintain a uniform database of these less severe crashes and the potential for reporting bias and less rigorous redundancy checks for non-fatal crashes make these data less reliable. Considering only fatal crashes is likely a lower bound on the impact of DST on all automobile crashes. Fridstrom et al. (1995) My baseline specication uses Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik's (2012) optimal 17 Results using a global polynomial are qualitatively identical and are available in appendix Table   A2 .
Other Data Sources
18 I refer to this as the aggregate impact, because it does not yet disentangle the DST mechanisms.
bandwidth selector to determine how many days to use on either side of the DST transition and a uniform kernel. As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) Moving to a xed eects framework, I run the following specication to take advantage of this variation in DST assignment:
DayofYear d is a separate dummy for each day of the year, exibly controlling for the impact of seasonality on fatal crashes.
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DayofWeek dy and Year y are day-of-week and year dummies respectively. V dy is a vector of controls used in some specications, including gasoline prices, the value of the S&P 500 index and non-stationary holidays. SpDST dy is an indicator equal to one if the date falls under DST and is covered by the range of spring switching dates (March 8th -April 7th). Analogously, FaDST dy is an indicator equal to one if the date falls under DST and is covered by the range of switching dates in the fall (Oct 25th -Nov 7th). These are the coecients of interest and are interpreted as the average eect of DST on fatal crashes over the switching dates in that season.
Note, that β 1 here is a dierent parameter from what is found using the RD design. Regression discontinuity estimates the eect of DST right at the spring transition, whereas the xed eects specication measures the average eect of DST over all dates that are sometimes DST and sometimes Standard Time during the spring. If DST only creates a short-run eect through sleep deprivation, this should be picked up in the RD, but would be averaged out across the full range of switching dates when using the xed eects model. Likewise, β 2 is the average eect of DST across the roughly two weeks of fall switching dates, rather than the eect of leaving DST in the fall.
Beyond identifying the average eect of DST across the range of switching dates, this specication can aid in disentangling the mechanisms. I isolate the light mechanism in the spring, by focusing only on dates at least two weeks following the transition, at which time any sleep impact should have dissipated. Comparing this light impact to the initial impact from light and sleep provides another measure for just the sleep impact. Figure 4 illustrates the regression discontinuity strategy for estimating the impact of DST on fatal crashes. The average residuals from a regression of log(daily fatal crash count) on day-of-week and year dummies are plotted, centered by the spring transition date. The plot follows a gradual arc demonstrating the seasonal pattern in fatal crashes, where crashes rise from winter lows, peaking in late summer before dropping again through the fall. If DST has an impact on fatal crashes, this should be evident in a trend break right at the transition date. Visually, there is a short-term spike in fatal crashes before the residuals resume the seasonal trajectory. Table 1 shows the corresponding regression estimates.
Results

Spring RD Design
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The spring transition into DST is associated with a 6.3% increase in fatal crashes. This result persists using the bandwidth selectors of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and the cross-validation method of Ludwig and Miller (2007) seen in columns 2 and 3 respectively. To test whether the increase is due to one particular transition rule, I split the data into an early subsample (2002-06) that was subject to the April transition, and a late subsample (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) that is subject to the current March transition. While cutting the sample in half reduces precision, both time periods experience similar increases in fatal crashes at the transition. dates. If these dates, rather than DST are responsible for the increased crash counts, this test should reveal a similar increase in crashes to those seen in columns 1-5. The zero result in column 6 suggests that the increase in crashes is not simply due to the 21 Clustering by week or year tends to decrease standard errors as the shocks are negatively correlated, so I report the more conservative uncorrected standard errors.
22 Due to small sample size (pedestrian and pedacycle accidents account for only 15% of my sample), I am unable to address the question of whether pedestrians, or school-children in particular, would experience an even larger increase in the risk of being hit by a vehicle due to the darkened mornings of DST. Using the same RD design on this limited sample yields imprecise point estimates of similar magnitude to those using the full sample. transition dates, but due to the actual policy. 23 To address the concern that my results are driven by how I adjust the crash count for the transition date, I run two additional specications. First, I follow the method used by Janszky et al. (2012) and multiply the the crash count on the transition date by 24/23rds to calibrate for the shorter time period. Alternatively, I throw out the transition date altogether. In both cases, results are qualitatively identical to my main specication (see Table A1 ). The remainder of Table A1 shows that results are robust to alternative kernel choice, while Table A2 shows they are robust to using a global polynomial RD design. Overall, these results demonstrate that spring transition into DST is associated with a signicant increase in fatal crashes. Now I turn to the fall transition to test whether there is an analogous reduction in crashes when leaving DST. Figure 5 illustrates the regression discontinuity strategy for the fall. In contrast to the spring, the residual plot looks quite smooth as it crosses the fall transition date. Table 2 presents the corresponding regression results. Just as the residual plot suggests, the preferred specication in column 1 indicates no signicant change in fatal crashes associated with leaving DST. This result is robust to alternative bandwidths (columns 2-3) and splitting the sample into just the old October or current November transition date (columns 4-5). Using an analogous placebo test to that used in the spring suggests that these transition dates do not systematically alter crash risk independent of a policy.
Fall RD Design
Taken as a whole, the transition from DST back to Standard Time does not reduce fatal crash risk in the same way entering DST increases risk. I now turn back to the mechanisms through which DST could impact crash risk to explain this asymmetric eect.
Mechanisms
The spring transition is subject to both the light and sleep mechanism. Hence, the 6.3% increase in fatal crashes could be partially due to each mechanism. The most parsimonious method for decomposing this result into each mechanism uses only aggregate results from the spring and fall. Given the fall transition is not subject to any change in sleep quantity, it isolates the light mechanism. The aggregate eect of zero when leaving DST in the fall suggests no net impact of DST through the light mechanism. Dierenc- ing the spring estimate of 6.3% (light and sleep mechanism active) and the fall estimate of zero (only light mechanism active) provides suggestive evidence that the impact of the spring transition should be attributed solely to the sleep loss mechanism. 24 However, dierences in sunrise and sunset times and the potential for dierences in driver behavior between the spring and fall transitions prevent this from being an ideal comparison. To further disentangle the mechanisms, I use the initial RD framework with sub-samples of hours selected to isolate the impact of one mechanism or the other.
Light
Since only the light mechanism is active during the fall, the aggregate fall eect of zero suggests no net impact through this channel. To determine if light has become altogether unimportant as a fatal crash risk factor, perhaps through improved vehicle lights, I further explore the light mechanism by examining sub-samples of hours closest to sunrise and sunset. it is likely that light no longer plays an important role in fatal crashes. Table 3 details the results.
Across dierent bandwidths, leaving DST is associated with a signicant reduction in fatal crashes during the morning (more ambient light). Conversely, evening hours (less ambient light) are always associated with a signicant increase in fatal crashes. These results suggest that light still plays an important role in fatal crash risk. However, the aggregate zero eect (Column 1) suggests these impacts balance out and light has no 24 The aggregate estimates for leaving DST tend to be positive (though insignicant). By symmetry, if leaving DST increases fatal crash risk this implies that entering DST reduces fatal crash risk. Hence, if anything, the light mechanism reduces crashes during DST (as suggested by Broughton, Hazelton, and Stone (1999) and Ferguson et al. (1995) ). As such, the 6.3% increase in crashes in the spring is, if anything, a downwardly biased estimate of the sleep mechanism. 
Sleep
The spring transition is subject to both the sleep and light mechanisms. However, my estimates for the fall transition suggest that the net impact of the light mechanism is zero. Taking a closer look at the spring residual plot in Figure 7 provides a clearer picture of what is occurring right at the spring transition. There is a discontinuous jump in fatal crashes that seems to persist for the rst six days of DST, before jumping back down to essentially the same seasonal path seen during Standard Time. Since the light mechanism is in eect for the entire period of DST, this data pattern is inconsistent with a light impact we would not expect the crash count to jump back down. However, a shock to sleep should only be felt in the initial period following the transition, before dissipating exactly the phenomena seen here.
To pry further at the sleep mechanism, I focus on a sub-sample of hours furthest away from sunset and sunrise to mitigate the light impact.
26 Figure 8 illustrates the discontinuity while Table 4 provides the regression results. The point estimates are quite similar to the full day impacts and are signicant using two of the three bandwidth selectors. This suggests that it is the sleep mechanism, not light, that causes the shortrun increase in fatal crashes following the spring transition. To further investigate the mechanisms and to determine the length of this sleep impact, I turn to the xed eects model. Table 5 presents the results from the FE model. The point estimates represent the average impact of DST over the full range of switching dates (dates that are DST in some years and Standard Time in others), rather than just at the threshold. While the initial columns examine the spring DST period as a whole, columns 3-7 break spring DST down into three components (i) the rst six days of DST, where the sleep eect should be felt most strongly; 27 (ii) the next eight days of DST, the longest any sleep 26 I say mitigate not eliminate because the angle of the sun and moon are still altered even in these hours of full light and full darkness.
Fixed Eects Model
27 I choose six days based on the appearance of the residual plot seen in Figure 7 . This covers the Sunday-Friday following the spring transition and is consistent with the literature on how long DST impacts sleeping patterns. study suggests a sleep impact could persist; and (iii) the remainder of spring DST with common support, days in which only the light mechanism should remain present.
Beginning with the entire spring period, column 1 shows that spring DST is associated with a signicant 3.4% increase in fatal crashes over the roughly one month of switching dates. The fall estimate is insignicant from zero, again suggesting no impact of DST in the fall.
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In addition to day-of-year xed eects, column 1 uses just day-of-week and year dummies, the same controls used in the RD design. Column 2 includes additional covariates for nonstationary holidays, gasoline prices and the value of the S&P 500 index. 29 Results are quite stable across columns and continue to suggest that DST causes a signicant increase in crashes during the spring and has no eect during the fall.
Turning to columns 3-4, the results are broadly consistent with a sleep impact that diminishes further from the spring transition and no net impact from reallocating light.
The rst six days of DST experience a signicant 5.6% increase in fatal crashes, quite similar to the 6.3% increase found in the RD design. The point estimate shrinks to an insignicant 2.9% during the next eight days and diminishes further to 1.8% for the remainder of the spring. During both time periods in which only the light mechanism is active, the fall and the spring following the rst two weeks, there is no signicant change in crash counts. Including additional controls in column 4 to help proxy for the character and amount of vehicle miles traveled leaves results qualitatively identical.
Columns 5-7 explore these impacts across dierent times of day, reinforcing previous ndings regarding the sleep mechanism. Column 5, uses just the subsample of hours least eected by the light mechanism, eectively isolating the sleep mechanism. The 4.8% increase in crashes during the rst six days of DST provides a measure of the impact of just the sleep deprivation mechanism on crashes during these hours. Across each subsample of hours, the point estimates drop from the rst six days of DST to beyond the rst two weeks of DST in the spring. This suggests that across all hours, mitigating the sleep mechanism reduces fatal crash risk. Overall, the body of evidence from the FE model aligns with that found from the RD model. There is a signicant short-term increase in fatal crashes following the spring transition, consistent with a detrimental impact of sleep loss. Now I turn to plausible alternative explanations for this short-term spike in fatal crashes.
28 The fall estimates are less precise because there was only a 1-week extension to DST in the fall, providing fewer switching dates than in the spring.
29 Adding each additional covariate individually leaves results qualitatively identical.
Alternative Explanations
A key omitted variable in this analysis and previous studies is Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT). If VMT increases at the DST transition date, this behavioral change could be driving results rather than sleep loss. While national VMT data is not available, the Performance Measurement System (PeMS) in California tracks VMT on many major highways within the state. Using the same regression discontinuity model from equation 1 with log(VMT) as the dependent variable yields an insignicant 0.016% increase in VMT. To the extent that driving habits on these California roadways are representative of national driving patterns, this suggests VMT is not the cause of increased crashes.
Adverse weather conditions increase the risk of fatal crashes (Fridstrom et al., 1995) .
Although weather is a pseudo-random phenomena, if adverse weather occurred just following the spring transition, this could lead to the short-term increase in fatal crashes.
Using a FARS variable that indicates weather conditions at each fatal crash, I create a variable for the ratio of crashes within a day that are impacted by weather. Using the regression discontinuity model from equation 1 with weather-ratio as the dependent variable I nd an insignicant 1.2 percentage point decrease in weather related crashes.
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This analysis suggests that some of the most likely alternative pathways cannot explain the increase in fatal crashes. Further, if the increase is due to adjusting to a new schedule, the same increase should occur immediately following the fall transition, a phenomena that we do not see. While this is not an exhaustive list of competing explanations, the balance of evidence points strongly towards DST increasing fatal crash risk, through the mechanism of sleep deprivation. In the next section, I explore whether this result varies by region.
Geographical Heterogeneity
At the national level, the spring transition into DST leads to a signicant increase in fatal crashes. However, this could be due to a constant treatment eect where all regions experience the same 6% increase in crashes, or a heterogeneous treatment eect where some regions experience a larger increase and others experience little or no eect. In this section, I explore two pathways through which geography could lead to heterogeneous impacts of DST, one through the sleep mechanism and the other through the light mechanism.
30 The residual plots and regression output for both of these alternative explanations are available in the appendix.
Sleep deprivation could be more detrimental when driving in already dangerous area.
If there are more situations where a delayed response can lead to a crash, the sleep mechanism has more scope to operate. To test this hypothesis, I split my sample in two based on the median number of fatal crashes per capita in each county. 31 The counties with a higher per capita fatal crash rate, I refer to as high risk counties. Running the RD analysis with these subsamples (Table A4 ) provides weak evidence that high risk counties are subject to a larger initial increase in fatal crashes (in percentage terms) than their low risk counterparts. While the estimates may not be statistically dierent at conventional levels, in all cases the point estimate for high risk counties is above that of low risk counties. This provides suggestive evidence that sleep loss is more detrimental when performing a more dicult task.
If ambient light is more important in certain hours than others, heterogeneity in sunrise and sunset times within a time zone could lead to dierential impacts of DST.
Sunrise occurs earliest in the Eastern portion of any time zone; in Boston, sunrise the day before DST occurs at 6:07 a.m. whereas in Louisville, Kentucky, it occurs at 7:04 a.m. In Boston, the onset of DST moves sunrise back an hour to roughly 7 a.m. while in Louisville sunrise is moved to roughly 8 a.m. If light is more important for fatal crashes (perhaps due to more driving) during the 7-8 a.m. hour relative to the 6-7 a.m. hour, Louisville should experience a bigger morning increase in fatal crashes (in percentage terms) than Boston.
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To test this mechanism, I split the sample into an Eastern, Western, and Central third of each timezone.
33 Table A5 shows the RD results. In contrast to what might be expected based on common commute times, results are quite similar for both areas. Figure A1 helps to elucidate this nding. While the darkened hour in the Eastern portion of time zones has fewer fatal crashes and the brightened hour has more fatal crashes, it is a very minor dierence. Further, the average sunset and sunrise times in the Eastern and Western portion of a timezone is closer than the full hour seen in the Boston -Louisville example. This geographic heterogeneity could be explored further in other applications where higher frequency events would increase the power of the test and allow for more narrow geographic areas than one third of a timezone. In terms of DST, this result should be viewed as one piece of the puzzle, to be examined in conjunction with research on other impacts of DST. In previous research, when a benet of DST is found it tends to be through the light mechanism. More light in the evening has benets at reducing crime (Doleac and Sanders, 2013) and encouraging exercise (Wol and Makino, 2013) . 35 When costs are found, similar to my study, it tends to be due to sleep loss or disruptions associated with transitions (Janszky et al., 2012) .
Taking these points in combination, an ideal policy solution would leave the benets of DST intact while eliminating the damage caused by the spring transition. Before a signicant policy change is made, further research should be conducted on the welfare eects of the policy.
Finally, this paper ts into the small but growing literature examining the impact of sleep on worker productivity (Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi, 2000; Lockley et al., 2007; Barnes and Wagner, 2009; Wagner et al., 2012) . Although fatal vehicle crashes are an extreme measure of productivity, driving is an activity that over 90% of American work- 35 One concern about DST is that morning rise time relative to sunrise time is an important factor in clinical depression (Olders, 2003) .
ers engage in (Winston, 2013) and DST provides an exogenous shock to sleep quantity.
The increased risk of a fatal vehicle crash suggests signicant costs of sleep deprivation, even when undertaking a routine task. Given the ongoing trend towards less sleep, particularly among full-time workers (Knutson et al., 2010) , it is important that researchers continue to investigate the relationship between sleep and productivity. My results represent a lower bound for the overall cost of DST through sleep deprivation, since reductions in workplace productivity are unaccounted for. Dependent Var: Log fatal crashes; all specs use day-of-week and year dummys, a first order polynomial and a uniform kernel. Leaving DST is the estimate of the discontinuity in fatal crashes that occurs immediately following the fall transition out of DST. "Morning" refers to 4-9am; "Evening" is 3-8pm. CCT refers to the bandwidth selector of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2012) ; IK is Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) ; CV is the cross-validation method of Ludwig and Miller (2007) . Robust standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3 : RD estimates of the influence of ambient light on fatal crashes when leaving DST Dependent Var: Log fatal crashes; all specs use day-of-year, day-of-week and year dummys. Remainder of Spring DST is an indicator variable equal to one if the day occurs after the first two weeks of DST and by April 7th, the final spring switching date. Fall DST is an indicator variable equal to one if the day falls under DST and occurs on Oct 25th or later, the first fall switching date. Additional Controls are ln(gas prices), ln(S&P index) and dummies for nonstationary holidays. Morning refers to 4-9am; Evening refers to 3-8pm; Least Light Affected are the remaining hours. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 5 : FE estimates of the impact of DST on fatal crashes -decomposing spring DST All Hours
